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A NEW SWORD TO SLAY THE DRAGON:
USING NEW YORK LAW TO COMBAT
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
Kimberlianne Podlas*
The campaign against environmental injustice is still in its devel-
opmental stage, particularly with regard to identifying viable legal
strategies. Legal scholarship on the topic has largely been confined
to recounting failed attempts to litigate environmental racism
claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment
and, recently, suggesting Federal Title VI and VIII as potential
remedies. Few have considered state laws. None have considered
the options available under New York State constitutional and stat-
utory law. This is surprising because state laws commonly provide
remedies when federal laws do not. In fact, it is their historically
greater dynamism that makes state laws the most fertile ground for
developing environmental remedies.
This article explores strategies specifically available to the New
York plaintiff seeking to raise an environmental racism claim.
Thus, this article does not intend to imply that federal statutes such
as Title VI and Title VIII should not be used where they can offer
meaningful relief. Instead, it seeks to encourage plaintiffs to avail
themselves of New York State provisions as either primary reme-
dies, using federal statutes for guidance, or in conjunction with fed-
eral claims.
Although an exhaustive analysis of environmental racism is be-
yond the scope of this article, Part I provides a brief overview of
the problem labeled "environmental racism." Part II discusses the
historical interplay between state and federal law, explaining the
superiority of state provisions for developing litigation strategies
with regard to new or innovative legal claims. Finally, Part III
identifies the areas within New York law-constitutional and statu-
tory-that might be used in such litigation. Each area identified is
addressed separately, its federal analogues are analyzed as para-
digms, and, finally, its potential for use in environmental racism
litigation is assessed.
* Associate Appellate Counsel, Legal Aid Society, New York City, NY; Adjunct
Faculty Member, Department of Legal Studies, Montclair State University, Montclair,
NJ. State University of New York at Buffalo (B.A. 1988, J.D. 1991).
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I. An Overview of Environmental Racism
A. What Is Environmental Racism
One of the most disturbing trends within, and consequences of,
the environmental movement is environmental race discrimination,
or as it is more commonly known, "environmental racism." Ben
Chavis has defined environmental racism as racial discrimination in
environmental policy-making and the unequal enforcement of en-
vironmental laws and regulations.' He described it as the "deliber-
ate targeting" of communities of color for toxic waste facilities and
the official sanctioning of the presence of life-threatening chemi-
cals in these communities. 2 Intent is the defining characteristic of
this definition.
While Chavis's definition may offer something in terms of polit-
ical appeal or momentum, it also invites a more onerous burden. If
one defines the problem of environmental racism as intentional dis-
crimination, one is then constrained to prove intentional discrimi-
nation, i.e., racial animus, rather than merely disparate impact.3
By contrast, an alternative school of thought focuses on effects.
It defines environmental racism as "[A]ny policy, practice, or direc-
tive that, intentionally or unintentionally, differentially impacts or
disadvantages individuals, groups, or communities based on race or
color."4 Although most authors have not acknowledged the differ-
ence between these definitions, the precision of thought exhibited
by this approach allows environmental rights activists to avoid al-
ready-foreclosed remedial paths at the developmental stage of liti-
gation strategy. Consequently, the Bullard definition of
environmental racism appears to be more widely accepted among
litigants.
1. Chavis is credited with coining the term "environmental racism" in his March
1993 testimony before a congressional committee. Although he is credited with coin-
ing the term, Chavis is by no means the consensus leader of this movement. He has
been severely criticized by community organizations concerning his and the NAACP's
collaborating with insurance companies, petroleum companies, and some of the other
staunchest opponents of Superfund liability and Superfund toxic waste cleanup, to kill
President Clinton's Superfund reauthorization bill. See Marianne Lavelle, Did
NAACP's Ben Chavis Switch Sides, or Work to Bring Opponents Together?, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 5, 1994, at Al.
2. Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, 25 ENvTL. L. 285, 289 (1995).
3. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
4. Fisher, supra note 2, at 289 (quoting sociologist Robert D. Bullard, Environ-
mental Equity: Examining the Evidence of Environmental Racism, LAND USE F., Win-
ter 1993, at 6).
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B. How the Modern Environmental Movement Has Fostered
Environmental Racism
Somewhat ironically, the problem of environmental racism has
grown out the environmental movement itself. Because environ-
mental protection laws do not eliminate dangers completely, but,
rather, reduce and redistribute them, this seemingly race-neutral
field is prone to racism. For decades, the neighborhoods of people
of color have borne a disproportionate share of the nation's nox-
ious risks and environmental hazards.5 The most common of these
risks include municipal landfills and incinerators, abandoned toxic
waste dumps, and lead-poisoned paint.6
The discriminatory effect on people of color is not surprising for
environmental protection laws do not eliminate dangers entirely,
but merely reduce and redistribute them. This is ensured by the
battle cry of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) which continues to
resonate within modern environmentalism. NIMBY targets waste
disposal facilities, 7 assorted group homes and shelters, and low-in-
5. As such hazards are also disproportionately visited upon low-income commu-
nities, it has been suggested that the problem of discriminatory siting may be one of
income rather than ethnicity.
Investigation, however, has shown that this is not the case. Professor Bullard's
studies show that lead poisoning disproportionately affects children of color at every
class level. Robert Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, in Toxic STRUGGLES
26 (Richard Hofrichter ed., 1993). Lead affects three to four million children in the
United States, most of whom are Latino or African-American and live in urban areas.
Id. Among children under 6 years of age, the percentage of African-American chil-
dren who have excessive levels of lead in their blood far exceeds the percentage of
white children who do at all income levels. Id. For families earning less than $6,000
per year, 68% of African-American children had lead poisoning whereas only 36% of
white children did. Id.
Additionally, with regard to Superfund cleanup, communities of color wait up to
four years longer than white communities to obtain cleanup. Marianne Lavelle and
Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S4. Furthermore, when cleanup was implemented, white com-
munities received permanent treatment remedies 22 times more frequently than did
communities of color, who typically received containment technologies. Id. See gen-
erally COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL
AND SoCIo-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES (1987); Valerie J. Phillips, Have Low Income, Minorities Been Left out
of the Environmental Cleanup?, ADVOCATE, Oct. 1994, at 16 (Idaho State Bar
Journal).
6. M. Patrice Benford, Life, Liberty, and Pursuit of Clean Air - Fight for Envi-
ronmental Equality, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 269 (1995).
7. Community wastes are primarily hazardous waste and municipal solid waste.
Most states have their own siting and disposal operation laws which are subject to
federal standards. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON TOXIC SUB-
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come housing units.8 This credo does not end all siting of hazard-
ous facilities,9 but, instead, moves them from white, affluent
suburbs to neighborhoods of those without clout, typically, people
of color. Therefore, while one community is relieved of the burden
of waste treatment and disposal facilities, another community is
burdened. "You do not reduce the risk, but change the identity of
the population exposed."' 10
Thus, the movement decrying environmental racism is antitheti-
cal to modern environmentalism. The battle is better fought by
attorneys seeking to ensure housing equity for people of color than
by those within the movement that have caused this inequity.1'
Although some have recently looked to federal civil rights statutes,
for the New York practitioner, New York law provides a better
starting point for housing equity in the context of environmental
racism.
II. Litigating Environmental Racism Claims: The Superiority of
State Law
Many who practice civil rights-impacted law have long known
that state statutes, including civil rights and human rights enact-
ments, are often better resources than their federal counterparts.
STANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING: A NATIONAL SURVEY (June
1987).
8. Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 496
(1994).
9. Charles J. McDermott, however, has distinguished the environmental equity
and environmental justice movements from the movement decrying environmental
discrimination. According to McDermott, the "environmental equity" movement
seeks to evenly balance the siting of hazardous facilities among all communities. The
"environmental justice" movement seeks to relieve all communities of such burdens.
Charles J. McDermott, Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 689 (1994).
10. Richard Lazarus, Address at the Annual Mitchell Lecture at the University of
Buffalo School of Law (Mar. 3, 1993).
11. The gulf between the civil rights and environmental movements, as well as a
fundamental distrust particularly on the part of the former toward the latter, is often
noted and hardly surprising: The environmental movement has traditionally focused
on the preservation of species and lands. Additionally, there has been an absence of
"minority clout" in the environmental law-making process and low membership in the
environmental bar. "Minorities fear that mainstream groups will co-opt environmen-
tal justice issues, and the people in the environmental groups don't like this issue. It's
threatening." Id.
Though one author has noted that "environmentalists and civil rights leaders have
joined forces" in this movement, Linda Blank, Seeking Solutions to Environmental
Inequity: The Environmental Justice Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 1109 (1994), this appears to be
more wishful thinking than any informed pronouncement of a true joint effort.
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This superiority is consistent with the greater dynamism historically
seen in the development of state laws.
Indeed, the Federal Bill of Rights was agreed upon only after
each of the original 13 states had adopted written constitutions. 2
The oldest of the criminal procedure rights to be incorporated into
these federal guarantees, the exclusionary rule, had previously
been used by state courts for several years prior to its recognition
at the federal level.13 Other procedural rights were also first recog-
nized by state courts.14
State laws may protect a broader category of rights, or protect a
broader array of similar rights, than their federal analogues. State
constitutions or statutes may protect explicitly what the Federal
Constitution protects only implicitly, 5 or lend a broader interpre-
tation to an identically worded clause. 16
The laws guarding against unreasonable search and seizure offer
a clear illustration of New York State law providing greater protec-
tion than its federal counterpart. New York employs a four-level
predicate-intrusion analysis, granting citizens greater protection
from police detention and arrest under the New York Constitution
than is provided by the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amend-
ment.17 In doing so, the Court of Appeals, while acknowleging the
similar language and common history of the two provisions, looked
beyond the texts to preexisting state statutes and common law de-
12. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 379, 381 (1980).
13. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by an
unconstitutional search is inadmissible).
14. Among these rights is that of court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants.
See Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wisc. 274, 278 (1859).
15. JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 1.03 (1992).
16. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990) (holding that warrant based on
probable cause is required to search garbage, rejecting California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988)); Pimental v. Department of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989) (hold-
ing that a roadblock was illegal under the state constitution, which can afford citizens
greater protection against government intrusion than the Federal Constitution despite
similarities between state and federal language); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135
(Colo. 1983) (holding that the installation of a pen register without a search warrant
supported by probable cause is an unreasonable search and seizure under the state
constitution).
Indeed, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, considering the racial
make-up of juries, has argued that the equal protection clauses of particular states'
constitutions provide for greater and different protection than their federal analogues.
George Kendall, Comments to NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Nov.
1991.
17. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 222, 352 N.E.2d 562, 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375,
384 (1976).
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fining the scope of the individual's right, the traditions of the state
regarding that right, and any distinctive attitudes of the state citi-
zenry toward the scope and protection of that right.18
Superior protections often evolve from state laws due to the po-
sitions that state courts and legislatures hold relative to the larger
legal hierarchy. The scope of their authority and the impact of
their decisions are limited to their local jurisdictions and constitu-
encies. Since state legislators and jurists are more accountable to
and more personally invested in local values and concerns, they
may be more willing to tackle new issues and consider innovative
approaches to those issues. This may result in state courts being
the venue of first impression for novel legal issues. Indeed, histori-
cally, state constitutions were enacted to respond to unaddressed
social ills. For example, Art. XVII § 1 of the New York State Con-
stitution was adopted "to recognize the responsibility of the State
for the aid, care and support of persons in need."' 19 Education,
health care, and housing have traditionally been considered mat-
ters for the states.2°
Looking to state law first is also logical for plaintiffs. As Justice
(then Professor) Linde explained:
the state constitution should be examined first, before any issue
under the federal fourteenth amendment. To begin with the
federal claim, as is customarily done, implicitly admits that the
guarantees of the state's constitution are ineffective to protect
the asserted right and that only the intervention of the federal
constitution stands between the claimant and the state.2'
Consequently, in considering strategies to combat environmental
racism, it behooves the New York State practitioner to look first to
18. Recently, the Court of Appeals disregarded the Supreme Court's decision on
the same "plain touch" issue handed down just a few months before. See People v.
Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 107, 612 N.E.2d 298, 299, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941 (1993).
The Rehnquist Court has not been a friend to civil rights advocates. For example,
the Court has revisited the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871, weakened affirmative
action programs by applying strict scrutiny to a contractor set-aside program and per-
mitting liberal use of third party collateral attacks on consent decrees, and, in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989), required the plaintiff to show
that "each ... practice has a significantly disparate impact," and that their statistical
analysis was insufficient to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact, to prevail
on a Title VII claim. This standard was later legislatively overturned and reduced in
the amendments to the Civil Rights Act.
19. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977); Richard
A. Halloran, State Constitutional Protection of Economic Rights, in 6 CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION AND ATrORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 256 (1990).
20. Halloran, supra note 19, at 256.
21. Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process", 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 182 (1970).
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state constitutional and statutory provisions. As state practition-
ers, we have the luxury, if not the responsibility, to be legal innova-
tors. Given the nascent state of environmental racism litigation
New York courts are free to proceed unhindered by any pre-ex-
isting analytical structures and can employ innovative analyses
that, in turn, may trickle up to the federal level.22
II. New York State Bases for Environmental Discrimination
Litigation
In New York State, four potential bases exist for litigating envi-
ronmental racism claims. They are Article I, § 11 of the New York
State Constitution, Article 2-A of the Civil Rights Law, the State
Human Rights Law, and local and municipal provisions, most
prominent among these, the New York City Administrative Code.
A. Article I, § 11 of the New York State Constitution
Article I, § 11 of the New York State Constitution provides that
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of
race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination
in his civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corpora-
tion, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision
of the state.2 3
The first sentence of this section is an equal protection provision
which, like the federal equal protection right, is addressed to "state
action. '2 4 The second sentence prohibits private as well as state
22. Some state courts and advocates analyze an overlapping state constitutional
provision only when dissatisfied with the current federal caselaw. This selective use of
state law views the state constitution as a supplemental rather than a primary source
of rights. FRIESEN, supra note 15, at § 1.04.
23. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
24. Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City of New
York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 360, n.6, 482 N.E.2d 1, 7, n.6, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522, 528, n.6 (1985);
Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 530, 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1949), cert.
denied 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
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discrimination as to "civil rights."25 "State action" is a prerequisite
for any claim under this section.26
The Court of Appeals has had occasion to consider whether the
proscription against "discrimination in civil rights" applies to a per-
son's opportunity to acquire an interest in realty.27 In Dorsey,
black plaintiffs sought to bring fair housing rights within the pur-
view of this section. The court, however, declined the invitation,
instead holding that the right to be free from racial discrimination
in acquiring housing was not a "civil right" within the meaning of
this constitutional provision.28
Although this appears not to bode well for those looking to the
state constitution for remedies against environmental racism, the
precedential harm of the case was diminished by the New York
State Human Rights Law, which explicitly enumerated housing as
a civil right.29 Thus, this forty-seven year old decision is not a hur-
dle to the civil rights litigator. Instead, it appears that the strongest
barrier to relying on Art. I is caselaw that has employed an analysis
identical to that of the Federal Equal Protection Clause.3 °
While recognizing that, "[i]n certain areas, of course, the New
York State Constitution affords the individual greater rights than
those provided by its Federal counterpart," the Court of Appeals
held that the wording of the state constitutional equal protection
clause "is no more broad in coverage than its Federal prototype"
and that the history of this provision shows that it was adopted to
25. Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 531, 87 N.E.2d at 548. "The term 'civil rights' was under-
stood by the delegates at the 1938 Constitutional Convention to mean 'those rights
which appertain to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community'....
'The Civil Rights Clause is not self-executing, however, and prohibits discrimination
only as to civil rights which are "elsewhere declared" by Constitution, statute, or com-
mon law."' People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 651, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d
647, 653 (1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 824 (1990).
26. See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647; Dorsey, 299 N.Y.
512, 87 N.E.2d 541; Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity v. New
York State Congress of Parents and Teachers, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d 548, 408 N.Y.S.2d 261
(Sup. Ct. 1978).
27. Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 531, 87 N.E.2d at 548.
28. This rested on the asserted right not being a "civil right" "elsewhere declared."
At that time, no statute recognized the right to the acquisition of an interest in real
property to be a civil right, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention in 1938 had
expressly rejected the designation of such an interest as a civil right, and the Legisla-
ture had recently declined to amend the Civil Rights Law to define the opportunity to
purchase and lease real property to be a civil right. Id.
29. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 291 (McKinney 1993).
30. The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits the state from
treating similarly situated individuals differently. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
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make it clear that New York State, like the federal government, is
affirmatively committed to equal protection, and was not prompted
by any perceived inadequacy in the Supreme Court's delineation of
the right.3
Furthermore, in considering the nature of discrimination and its
related burdens and proofs, the Court of Appeals has held that dif-
ferences in the application of laws to different groups do not vio-
late state equal protection guarantees unless the distinction is
invidious.32 Mirroring the federal standard, the party who alleges
the discriminatory enforcement carries a heavy burden of showing
that purposeful, intentional discrimination has taken place.33
This is the very burden one carries in alleging a violation of the
Federal Equal Protection Clause. 4 It is this heavy burden that
poses the most difficult challenge. One lower court has even held
that the breadth of New York's equal protection clause grants no
more protection than, but is co-equal to the Federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause.36 A discriminatory effect may be condemned, but it
alone is insufficient to sustain an equal protection challenge. As-
certaining whether our state constitutional provision holds promise
for litigating environmental racism claims, therefore, requires an
examination of the successes and failures of the Federal Equal Pro-
tection Clause in response to such claims.
1. The Use of the Federal Equal Protection Clause in
Environmental Racism Claims
Until three or four years ago, the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution had been the most
31. Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d 306, 313-14, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1094, 452 N.Y.S.2d
333, 337 (1982); Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 530-31, 87 N.E.2d at 548; Seaman v. Fedourich,
16 N.Y.2d 94, 102, 209 N.E.2d 778, 782, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444, 449 (1965) (state guarantee
of equal protection "is as broad in its coverage as that of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
32. In re Estate of Wilson, 59 N.Y.2d 461, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S.2d 900
(1983). See also Procaccino v. Board of Elections of City of New York, 73 Misc. 2d
462, 341 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
33. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
34. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252.
35. The federal methodology of equal protection analysis has greatly influenced
state courts: Virtually all state courts resort to federal-style equal protection method-
ology and terminology in applying state equal protection clauses (with the exception
of the unique state proscriptions against gender discrimination). FRIESEN, supra note
15, at § 3.01.
36. People v. Smith, 97 Misc. 2d 115, 411 N.Y.S.2d 146 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1978).
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common legal basis for challenging environmental racism.37 More
recently, however, its use as a tool in environmental actions has all
but been abandoned because of its onerous burden of proof. Re-
cent federal environmental justice cases have directly incorporated
the aforementioned burdens.38 To prevail on an environmental dis-
crimination claim under the Federal Equal Protection Clause, it is
not enough to show disparate impact on a suspect class.39 Instead,
a plaintiff must show that "discriminatory intent" played a role in
that siting, regardless of whether the actor was a landlord, a corpo-
rate polluter, or a state agency.40
Adding to the difficult burden of proof this created, the nature of
environmental discrimination is often negligent siting or competi-
tion among groups to avoid siting. This produces what is truly a
disparate impact unlikely to be accompanied by obvious discrimi-
natory motive. Consequently, the nature of the problem itself, i.e.,
discrimination in siting, is incompatible with the mechanics of an
equal protection claim.41 This forcefully demonstrates the failings
in the Chavis definition of environmental racism. Recall that
Chavis deems environmental racism as the "deliberate targeting"
of communities of color. By so prominently featuring intent in the
definition, he takes on the onerous burden of proving intent, rather
than being able to rely on disparate impact. This obviously nar-
rows a plaintiff's litigation options.
New York courts have held that, despite additional phraseology,
the New York equal protection clause offers no more protection
than and demands the same proofs as its federal counterpart.42
Therefore, the intent barrier associated with environmental litiga-
tion under the Federal Equal Protection Clause also exists under
the New York State equal protection provision. Consequently,
since litigation under the federal clause has been unsuccessful,
there is no reason to believe that the equally burdened state provi-
sion offers any greater promise in fighting this battle.
37. Donna Gareis-Smith, Environmental Racism: The Failure of Equal Protection
To Provide a Judicial Remedy and the Potential of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 13
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 57 (1994).
38. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th
Cir. 1992).
39. See Gareis-Smith, supra note 37, at 57-58.
40. Id. This formidable hurdle has caused some to suggest a federal statute requir-
ing only a showing that siting had a discriminatory impact on communities of color.
See id.
41. Id. at 58.
42. E.g., Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 530-31, 87 N.E.2d at 548.
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B. New York State Civil Rights Law
Article 2-A of the New York Civil Rights Law grants "equal
rights to publicly-aided housing" to the residents of the state.43
This law concerns only multiple dwellings that were financed with
public monies after 1950.4 It became effective in 1950, one year
after the Court of Appeals decision in Dorsey, which held that
housing was not a civil right within the meaning of the state equal
protection clause.45
Article 2-A was enacted under the police power of the state to
fulfill and enforce the provisions of the constitution of this state
concerning civil rights. 6 Under its terms, it is illegal
(1) For the owner of any publicly assisted housing accommoda-
tion to refuse to rent or lease or otherwise deny or withhold
from any person or group of persons such housing accommoda-
tion because of the race, color, religion, national origin or ances-
try of such person or persons.
(2) For the owner of any publicly assisted housing accommoda-
tion to discriminate against any person because of the race,
color, religion, national origin or ancestry of such person in the
terms, conditions or privileges of any publicly assisted housing
accommodations or in the furnishing of facilities or services in
connection therewith.47
The scope of Article 2-A is as broad as, and, in some respects
broader than, the federal Fair Housing Act 48 of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act.49 At the time of its adoption, the state Civil Rights
Law was intended to be the first avenue of recourse for New
Yorkers subjected to housing discrimination.5 ° Section 18-d of the
Article, defining the specific remedies and damages, permits an ag-
grieved party to seek judicial relief.51 The party may obtain either
money damages5 2 or "equitable remedies" including "affirmative
relief" "to undo the effects of such violation. ' '53
43. N.Y. Civ. RiGrrs LAW art. 2-A, §§ 18-a to 19-b (McKinney 1992).
44. New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apts., Inc.,
10 Misc. 2d 334, 338, 170 N.Y.S. 750, 755 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
45. Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 531, 87 N.E.2d at 548.
46. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 18(a).
47. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 18(c)(1), (2).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3619 (1994).
49. Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
50. Id. at 107.
51. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 18-d(1).
52. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 18-d(2).
53. Id.
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A mere twelve months later, language virtually identical to that
of 2-A was repeated in Section 296(2-A) of the New York Human
Rights Law.54 The Human Rights Law also prohibited discrimina-
tion in publicly-assisted housing, and both statutes employed the
same definition of publicly-assisted housing accommodations.5 It
appears that the adoption of the Human Rights Law truncated the
development of Article 2-A jurisprudence. A review of the
caselaw reveals a handful of cases addressing the statute's provi-
sions. Most of those cases define the protections of Article 2-A
with reference to the corresponding provisions of the Human
Rights Law.56 The historical primacy of the Human Rights Law
may be due to its more expansive scope and its specific investiga-
tion and enforcement provisions. Consequently, because Article 2-
A jurisprudence has not developed independent of, but by reliance
on, the Human Rights Law, the use of Article 2-A in litigating en-
vironmental racism claims will be discussed under that section
below.
C. The New York State Human Rights Law
1. The Provisions
Seeking a programmatic mechanism 57 to combat discrimination
and promote equal opportunity, in 1951 the legislature enacted Ar-
ticle 15 of the Executive Law, also known as the Human Rights
Law. Relying on the police power of the state,58 the Act abolished
discrimination in the provision of basic opportunities59 in New
York State. 60 As the statute's purpose clause explained:
the state has the responsibility to act to assure that every indi-
vidual within this state is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy
a full and productive life and that the failure to provide such
equal opportunity, whether because of discrimination, prejudice,
intolerance or inadequate education, training, housing or health
care not only threatens the rights and proper privileges of its
54. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1993).
55. Compare N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 18(c)(3) and 18(b)(3) with N.Y. EXEC.
LAW 88 296(2-A) and 292(11).
56. See, e.g., New York State Commission Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall
Apts., Inc., 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
57. Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 132, 204 N.E.2d 627, 633, 256 N.Y.S.2d
584, 592 (1965).
58. N.Y. EXEC. LAW, art. 15, §§ 290-92 (McKinney 1993).
59. Koerner v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 442, 448, 467 N.E.2d 232, 234, 478 N.Y.S.2d 584,
586-87 (1984).
60. Rochester Hosp. Serv. Corp. v. Division of Human Rights, 92 Misc. 2d 705,
707, 401 N.Y.S.2d 413, 415 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free
democratic state and threatens the peace, order, health, safety
and general welfare of the state and its inhabitants.61
The proscriptions of the Human Rights Law are directed at dis-
crimination in both privately-owned and publicly-assisted hous-
ing.62 The law provides that it is unlawful for the owner,
proprietor, lessee, managing agent of, employee of, or any other
person having the right to rent or lease a housing accommodation:
5(a)(1) To refuse to sell, rent, lease or otherwise to deny or to
withhold from any person or group of persons such a housing
accommodation because of the race ... color, national origin...
of such person or persons.
5(a)(2) To discriminate against any person because of the race
... color, [or] national origin ... in the terms, conditions or
privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any such housing accom-
modation or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connec-
tion therewith.63
Tracking the language of the Civil Rights Law in addressing
"publicly-assisted housing," the Human Rights Law made it unlaw-
ful "[t]o discriminate against any person because of race ... color,
[or] national origin ... in the terms, conditions or privileges of the
sale, rental or lease of any such housing accommodation or in the
facilities or services therewith. 64
Notably, the Act proclaimed "equality of opportunity a civil
right" and enumerated a variety of human concerns which the term
opportunity was intended to encompass, including the "housing ac-
commodations" listed.65 The Act not only empowered the Divi-
sion to "eliminate and prevent discrimination in . . . housing
61. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290(3).
62. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2-A).
63. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5).
64. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2-A). "Publicly-assisted housing" includes not only
public housing, housing operated under the supervision of the commissioner of hous-
ing, and various multiple dwelling or accommodation housing, but also housing con-
structed after July 1, 1950 which was 1) built with taxes, 2) constructed on land sold
below cost by the state pursuant to the federal housing act, 3) constructed on property
acquired or assembled by the state through condemnation or otherwise for the pur-
pose of such construction, or 4) "for the acquisition, construction, repair or mainte-
nance of which the state ... supplies funds or other financial assistance." Id.
65. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(2). "'Housing accommodation' includes any building,
structure, or portion thereof which is used or occupied or is intended, arranged or
designed to be used or occupied, as the home, residence or sleeping place of one or
more human beings." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(10).
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accommodations" but also, and very importantly, "to take other
actions against discrimination as herein provided .... 66
In applying the statute, courts are guided by three principles:
first, that the statute is to be construed liberally to accomplish its
objectives; second, that the commissioner possesses broad powers
to effectively eliminate the unlawful discriminatory practices enu-
merated in the statute; and third, that discrimination is usually ac-
complished "by devious and subtle means" and, therefore, is rarely
so obvious or its practices so overt that it is instantly or conclu-
sively recognized.67
2. Bringing a Claim Under the New York Human Rights Law
With regard to the mechanics of the statute, New York courts
have looked to caselaw pertaining to the Federal Civil Rights Acts
for guidance.68 They have particularly focused on these acts in de-
termining the burdens of proof of the respective parties. For exam-
ple, the burdens in an employment discrimination claim under the
New York State Civil Rights Act are the same as those in a claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.6 9 Indeed, the
elements of the claims under state and federal law are "virtually
identical. 70
Significantly, the federal anti-discrimination statutes have re-
placed the demanding "discriminatory intent" standard imposed in
an equal protection claim with a showing of "disparate impact."
The Supreme Court has explained the difference between discrimi-
natory intent or treatment and discriminatory effect, commonly
termed disparate impact:
"Disparate treatment" . . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less fa-
66. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 290(3).
67. 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 183,
379 N.E.2d 1183, 1188, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 58 (1978).
68. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir. 1992).
69. The courts have also looked to Title VII actions for guidance. In Kump v.
Xyvision, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 554, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), a gender discrimination suit,
the court found that the analysis under the New York State Human Rights Law mir-
rors that of a federal Title VII action. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII jurisprudence also applies in Title VI cases. Fisher,
supra note 2, at 321.
70. Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992).
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vorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical ...
"Disparate impact" [by contrast involves] practices that are
facially neutral in the treatment of different groups but that in
fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by a business necessity..... Proof of discriminatory mo-
tive, we have held, is not required under a disparate impact
theory.7'
As a result, when applying the anti-discrimination statutes,
"[e]ffect, and not motivation, is the touchstone. '72 This is not only
because discriminatory motivations may easily be concealed, but
because "the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disas-
trous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the per-
versity of a willful scheme. 7 3
Applying this standard to New York State's Human Rights Law,
the plaintiff has the burden of showing, by a "preponderance of the
evidence, ' 74 that there is probable cause to believe that the em-
ployer engaged in discriminatory practices. As with Title VII, the
plaintiff is not expected to produce direct evidence of discrimina-
tory animus. Instead, the plaintiff need only show disparate im-
pact.76 Once this prima facie case is established, the defendant
must prove that it acted for an independent, legitimate, non-
pretextual reason.77
In addition to applying the less burdensome disparate impact
standard, the Human Rights Law offers other advantages, one of
which is forum selection. The law provides each litigant with the
71. International Board of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977) (defining disparate impact in the employment context).
72. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
73. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), aff-d sub nom. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
74. Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F.2d 1319, 1325 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
467, 468 (1992); Gonzalez v. State Div. of Human Rights, 74 A.D.2d 596, 424
N.Y.S.2d 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (requiring "substantial evidence").
75. Boddie v. National Cleaning Contractors, Inc., 112 A.D.2d 421, 492 N.Y.S.2d
80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
76. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving an age
discrimination claim under the state Human Rights Law).
77. Belanoff v. Grayson, 98 A.D.2d 353, 356, 471 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984); J. W. Mays, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeals Bd., 84 A.D.2d 817,
444 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (citation omitted).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 makes it more difficult for a defendant in a Title VI or
VII (employment) action to rebut a showing of disparate impact: The defendant must
prove both the non-racial nature of the program and the necessity for maintaining it
in its current form. This Act legislatively reversed Wards Cove. See supra note 18.
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option of bringing her claim before the State Human Rights Com-
mission, a state court, or a local commission on human rights.78
Although the roles of each forum are, to some extent, mutually
exclusive,79 the choice of forum will be significant in terms of the
different evidentiary demands, burdens, and remedies.
If the plaintiff chooses to proceed via a commission on human
rights, which has the power to receive, pass on, and investigate
complaints,8" the evidence need not prove unlawful discrimination
beyond a reasonable doubt. All that is necessary is that the find-
ings be supported by sufficiently substantial evidence.8' Once this
lesser burden is met, the severely limited scope of appellate review
makes these findings almost impervious to review. In reviewing a
Commissioner's finding of unlawful discrimination, an appellate
court "may not weigh the evidence or reject [the Commissioner's]
choice where the evidence is conflicting and room for a choice ex-
ists."8 2 Furthermore, the court may not annul a finding unless it is
"arbitrary and capricious. ' 83 The Division is afforded this "consid-
erable deference.., because of its expertise in evaluating discrimi-
nation claims."'84
Finally, because the strict rules of evidence of courts of law or
equity do not apply to claims investigated by the Division of
Human Rights, and the standard of review is quite stringent, a
plaintiff choosing to proceed through the Division can essentially
prove more with less.
78. Scott v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 147 A.D.2d 33, 35, 541 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 297(9).
79. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 307 (1983), on
remand 136 A.D.2d 229, 232-33, 448 N.E.2d 86, 92, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 238 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988).
80. Koerner v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 442, 445, 467 N.E.2d 232, 233, 478 N.Y.S.2d 584,
585 (1984).
81. Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, 35, 339 N.E.2d
880, 883, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471, 475 (1975).
82. CUNY-Hostos Community College v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59
N.Y.2d 69, 75, 449 N.E.2d 1251, 1254, 463 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176 (1983).
83. E.g., State Office of Drug Abuse Servs. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 48
N.Y.2d 276, 284, 397 N.E.2d 1314, 1318, 422 N.Y.S.2d 647, 650 (1979); Sidoti v. New
York State Div. of Human Rights, 212 A.D.2d 537, 538, 622 N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1995).
84. Sidoti, 212 A.D.2d at 538, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 119. See also Board of Educ. v.
New York State Div. of Human Rights, 56 N.Y.2d 257, 261, 436 N.E.2d 1301, 1304,
451 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (1982); Drug Abuse Servs., 48 N.Y.2d at 284, 397 N.E.2d at
1318, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
85. For example, hearsay is admissible. State Div. of Human Rights v. Sweet
Home Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 73 A.D.2d 823, 423 N.Y.S.2d 748, 749 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979).
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3. Remedies Under the Human Rights Law
The State Human Rights Law offers a host of meaningful reme-
dies to victims of discrimination.86 These are found in section 297
and include cease and desist orders, affirmative remedial actions,
filing periodic reports on compliance,87 compensatory and, in the
case of housing discrimination, punitive damages,88 and payment to
the state of any profits obtained from illegal actions.89 The Divi-
sion is also empowered to first attempt to formulate a conciliation
agreement between the parties. Conciliation agreements may in-
clude provisions for the prospective cessation of unlawful discrimi-
natory conduct and may contain other provisions including entry of
consent decrees (embodying the terms of the conciliation agree-
ment) in the appropriate county court.90
The Court of Appeals has stated that the strong statutory policy
of not only eliminating but preventing discriminatory practices
gives the Division of Human Rights more discretion in effecting a
remedy than would exist under common law. 91 It is essential that
any remedies bear a reasonable relationship to the discriminatory
action and to the underlying legislative policy of this article.92
Even then, though the remedies available are broad in scope,93
there are some limits. For example, preferential policies toward a
86. This had not been true of the Federal Fair Housing Act. Prior to its 1988
amendments, it provided aggrieved persons only trivial economic incentives to initiate
corrective lawsuits. John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A
Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1583-84 (1993).
87. For example, violator-landlords have been required to file compliance reports
and to keep records of vacancies and rejections. State Div. of Human Rights v. Stem,
37 A.D.2d 441, 326 N.Y.S.2d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971).
88. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 136 A.D.2d 229, 232-33, 527
N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (punitive damages not available in claim of em-
ployment discrimination made before Division rather than state court). See also Cul-
len v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.Y.2d 492, 425 N.E.2d 858, 442
N.Y.S.2d 470 (1981). But see O'Brien v. King World Prods., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 639,
642 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The plaintiff may also be entitled to punitive damages under
the New York law"); Selbst v. Touche Ross & Co., 587 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (same).
89. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(4)(c)(i-vi).
90. N.Y EXEC. LAW § 297(3)(a).
91. Batavia Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of Moose v. New York State Div. of
Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 146, 316 N.E.2d 318, 320, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27 (1974).
92. Schuck v. State Div. of Human Rights, 102 A.D.2d 673, 478 N.Y.S.2d 279
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984); New York Inst. of Technology v. State Div. of Human Rights,
40 N.Y.2d 316, 324, 353 N.E.2d 598, 603, 386 N.Y.S.2d 685, 690 (1976).
93. See State Div. of Human Rights v. General Motors Corp., 107 A.D.2d 1081,
1082, 486 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (stating that the Division "has
more discretion in formulating remedial relief").
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
group have been deemed inconsistent with the guarantee of equal
protection in article I, section 11 of the New York Constitution. 4
4. Federal Paradigms for Environmental Discrimination
Litigation
In addition to sharing their burdens and standards of proof with
New York State's Human Rights Law, Title VIII of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act and Title VI of the 1964 (Federal) Civil Rights Act pro-
vide useful paradigms for asserting environmental racism claims.
In fact, the environmental movement has long borrowed the rheto-
ric and tactics of the civil rights movement. 95
a. Title VIII
Title VIII, known as the Fair Housing Act, is the principal fed-
eral statute created to combat residential discrimination. 6 The
Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination "against any person in
the sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith, because of" race, color, or na-
tional origin.97 This Act is construed liberally to ensure prompt
and effective elimination of all traces of discrimination within the
housing field.98 A Fair Housing suit may be brought against pri-
vate actors and those who do not receive federal money.99 There-
fore, Title VIII may be used to challenge the rezoning of
residential neighborhoods to allow noxious facilities or other inap-
propriate land uses.100
As previously noted, Title VIII employs a disparate impact
test' 0' and a shifting burden. The plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case that the conduct complained of actually or predictably
results in a discriminatory impact.0 2 The burden then shifts to the
94. State Div. of Human Rights v. AOS Realty Corp., 36 A.D.2d 970, 971 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1971).
95. Robert D. Bullard and Beverly Wright, The Quest for Environmental Equity:
Mobilizing the Black Community for Social Change, 1 RACE, POVERTY AND THE
ENV'T 3 (July 1990).
96. Boger, supra note 86, at 1581.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602, 3603, 3604 (1994).
98. United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1980),
aff'd, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
99. See infra notes 114-115 and accompanying text regarding hurdles to raising a
Title VI claim.
100. Luke Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling,
21 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 523, 535 (1994).
101. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1054-55.
102. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
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defendant to rebut this evidence with proof that its conduct is justi-
fied in theory and practice by a legitimate interest and that no fea-
sible alternative course of action would enable that interest to be
served with less discriminatory impact. 10 3
This is one of its most portentous attributes. Obviously, this
more lenient standard benefits environmental racism plaintiffs.
Moreover, it is more akin to the type of proof available in these
actions. Recall that the problem of environmental racism was first
discovered through studies showing a positive correlation between
the existence and siting of environmental risks and communities of
color. An adverse impact is often more explicitly demonstrated by
statistical evidence then by any "smoking gun" testimony or evi-
dence which might be elicited from a defendant.104
Furthermore, race need not be the sole or dominant motive un-
derlying the policies and results in question, but need only be one
of the factors. The court must evaluate factors such as the discrimi-
natory impact of the policy or practice, the historical background,
the sequence of events leading to the challenged conduct, depar-
tures from normal procedural sequences and from normal substan-
tive criteria, and the legislative or administrative history of the
challenged actions. A court may also consider whether the defend-
ant maintained a practice with knowledge of its discriminatory
impact.105
Despite its history and purpose of addressing housing discrimi-
nation, Title VIII has not been an option embraced by environ-
mental litigators in the past.10 6 The avoidance of this statute by
environmental litigators may be due to Title VIII's apparently nar-
row focus on the "provision of services or facilities in connection"
with the sale or rental of a dwelling. Although this language seems
to limit the scope of conduct that a Fair Housing claim may con-
template, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the major-
ity of the circuit courts have interpreted the scope of the phrase, let
alone interpreted it in such a narrow fashion.10 7
103. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1055.
104. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Pfaff, Fair Hous.-Fair Lend-
ing (P-H) 25,085 (1994 WL 592199, at *9) (H.U.D.A.L.J.).
105. Benford, supra note 6, at 285; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
106. Benford, supra note 6, at 283 n.123.
107. Richard Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993).
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b. Title VI
The more popular federal law sought to be applied by those as-
serting claims of environmental racism is Title VI of the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, several commentators have re-
cently looked to Title VI as a potential basis for asserting environ-
mental discrimination claims. 108 Title VI prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, gender, or national origin by "any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.' 109 This in-
cludes discrimination in the location of facilities as well as the
contracting, hiring, and distribution of benefits and services to
communities. 10
Arguments relying on Title VI are based on the premise that the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides
funding to various state (typically environmental) agencies."'
These agencies are responsible for environmental policies, notably
hazardous waste enforcement programs and the siting of hazardous
facilities and landfills. These state actors and recipients of EPA
funding are subject to the antidiscrimination requirements of Title
VI. 1 2 Consequently, if these state actors create a racially discrimi-
natory distribution of hazardous siting, Title VI has been
violated. 113
The major stumbling block to using Title VI to remediate envi-
ronmental racism claims lies in its federal funding proviso. 1 4 Title
VI applies only to programs or activities receiving federal funds.
The receipt of federal funds by one agency within a state govern-
ment is not sufficient to extend Title VI coverage to the activities of
other agencies even when all are subdivisions of the same
chartered governmental unit. 15 And, although there may be sig-
nificant federal financial assistance to state environmental pro-
108. See, e.g., id. at 837; Gareis-Smith, supra note 37.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
110. Gareis-Smith, supra note 37, at 58; Fisher, supra note 2, at 289.
111. Federal financial assistance to states is considerable. Lazarus, supra note 107,
at 835.
112. Fisher, supra note 2, at 312.
113. Id.
114. A Title VI environmental racism claim also requires something against which
to measure a disparate impact, a determination of what the impact is, i.e., whether it is
siting or actual, physical harm. Id. at 322.
115. Paul K. Sonn, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded Con-
struction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577,
1581 n.18 (1992).
1302
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
grams, many instances of environmental racism are caused by
private actors. 16
5. Using The State Human Rights Law to Fight Environmental
Racism
Several aspects of Human Rights Law section 296 (5)(1) and (2)
bear a striking resemblance to Title VIII, the federal Fair Housing
Act. Both specifically address discrimination in housing; both can
be asserted against private actors; and both prohibit discrimination
against the same enumerated groups. Similarly, Human Rights
Law section 296(2-A) (and article 2-A of the Civil Rights Law),
parallels Title VI's financial nexus in its public funding require-
ment. Consequently, the environmental discrimination litigation
strategies presently being developed with regard to these federal
statutes provide frameworks for contemplating the use of the New
York provisions. Nonetheless, the New York provisions hold far
more promise for meaningful relief in this area.
a. "Denial of Housing"
The Human Rights Law and Title VIII each prohibit discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of housing." 7 This prohibition addresses
the traditional forms of housing discrimination, denial of an apart-
ment to a person of color or steering because of color. Since its
enactment, 5(a)(1) has been applied to only these traditional types
of claims. This history of use, therefore, likely precludes 5(a)(1)
from being used in an innovative way independent of traditional
types of actions.
It might be possible, however, to piggyback an environmental
racism claim with a 5(a)(1) redlining or steering case. For example,
where people of color are steered to or away from a particular
housing area solely because of race, it is obviously discriminatory.
When people of color are steered into housing which is infested
with toxic risks, steering is not only discriminatory, but also race-
based environmental discrimination.
Yet, because the steering practices are already acknowledged as
housing discrimination within 5(a)(1), proof of illegal discrimina-
tory steering, alone, will suffice to obtain relief without an environ-
mental component, and, thus, the new environmental racism claim
will be unnecessary.
116. There is no such requirement of a financial nexus in a Title VIII claim.
117. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(5)(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that environmental racism
claims should not be raised in this context. In fact, there are sev-
eral strategic reasons for asserting environmental racism claims in
conjunction with more traditional housing discrimination claims.
As civil rights advocates can attest, courts often take considerable
time before they are willing to accept new types of claims or claims
raised in novel ways. By raising these innovative claims in conjunc-
tion with traditional ones, courts can begin to become familiar with
them. This serves a degree of judicial education. 118
Additionally, by piggy-backing claims, it will provide courts with
a more vivid illustration of what is going on in these neighborhoods
with regard to toxic hazards. This may have a positive spillover
effect to the final result as a court will now have the opportunity to
take these new arguments into consideration with regard to the or-
dering the appropriate damages or crafting meaningful remedies.
A court will be unable to order meaningful remedies if these com-
ponents of environmental racism claims are not properly before it.
Similarly, even where a court chooses not to rely on a particular
argument presented as the basis for its ultimate decision, it is not
uncommon for a court to note, in dicta, that another claim pos-
sessed or lacked merit, or was deficient in its briefing or proof.
These judicial asides provide litigators with helpful guides to the
propensity of the court to accept or reject particular claims so that
litigators can amend their future claims.
Finally, by phrasing this type of discrimination as a civil rights or
human rights issue offers a valuable symbolic function to communi-
ties. It may add a dimension of empowerment, for plaintiffs will be
able to state their complaint as one of discrimination based on
race.
119
b. "Furnishing of Services"
Section 296(5)(a)(2) of the Human Rights Law prohibits dis-
crimination "in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection
therewith."' 20 The second clause of Title VIII similarly prohibits
discrimination "in the provision of services or facilities in connec-
118. Cole, supra note 100, at 543.
119. The marriage of more traditional housing cases to environmental racism
claims is also possible with local and municipal laws pertaining to housing and build-
ing codes. One example is the Housing Maintenance Code found in the New York
City Administrative Code. The failure of an individual or municipal landlord to abide
by these housing codes would be the primary claim to which a claim of environmental
racism under the Human Rights Law would be attached. See infra Part III.D.3.b.
120. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(5)(a)(2).
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tion with such dwelling .... "121 The sole difference between these
clauses being the substitution of the term "provision" in the Title
VIII for the Human Rights Law's "furnishing."
The "furnishing of services" clause of the Human Rights Law
holds more promise as an independent cause of action than does
section 296(5)(a)(1). The strategies developed with regard to Title
VIII provide a useful model for how one might raise/conceptualize
a 5(a)(2) claim.
The "furnishing of services" provision has not yet been contem-
plated by New York state courts thus providing a clean slate for
New York practitioners. The clause need not be interpreted nar-
rowly to encompass only the traditional services of police protec-
tion, garbage collection, and snow removal. It also could be
interpreted to encompass state agencies that grant permits to waste
facilities for dumping and chemical plants that place landfills in
neighborhoods.
In almost all cases, the state has some degree, and often, a signif-
icant amount of control, over siting via placements, permits, or
services regarding waste disposal facilities. Most states have their
own siting and disposal operation laws which are subject to federal
standards. 122 Municipal solid waste disposal facilities (most land-
fills and incinerators) are owned by either municipalities or by pri-
vate companies, often under contract to one or more
municipalities. 123 Private companies under state or municipal con-
tract own and operate many of the waste disposal facilities in the
United States and are responsible for building new ones.124
Furthermore, the cumulative decision-making process could be
considered. This is not beyond the pale, for Title VIII has been
used to challenge the "segregative effect" of decisions, i.e., those
decisions that effectively perpetuate segregation. 125 Although a
single decision in a process may not directly cause a segregative
effect, a series of decisions may. This may be sufficient to show
effect.
Following the model of Title VIII suggested litigation, if these
neighborhoods are disproportionately burdened by these risks,
121. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
122. New York State Legislative Commission on Toxic Substances and Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting: A National Survey (June 1987).
123. Gerrard, supra note 8, at 512.
124. Id.
125. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980). See also Cole, supra note
100, at 535-36.
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risks which the State is responsible for managing, then people have
been discriminated against in violation of 5(2).
This can be enhanced by the recent spate of literature concern-
ing the disparate impact on people of color in siting and lack of
cleanup of toxic sites underlying Title VIII and Title VI claims.
Although New York practitioners do not need to establish a finan-
cial link to a federal program in order to fall within the terms of a
statute, these paradigms could be borrowed to establish the dispa-
rate impact for a prima facie showing of race-based discrimination.
Again, claims can be combined with provisions of local and mu-
nicipal housing codes. Where a housing code demands particular
action from a landlord, this could be interpreted to fall within the
"furnishing or services" provision. Where people of color are dis-
proportionately burdened by risks as an outgrowth of these serv-
ices, or, more likely, the lack of these services, both the housing
code and the proscription against discrimination embodied in 5(2)
are violated.
For example, in New York, the main cause of lead poisoning, a
typical environmental racism element, is poorly maintained hous-
ing built prior to the ban on interior lead paint.1 6 Nonetheless,
since 1982, the City of New York has had a lead abatement law that
requires landlords either to remove or cover lead-based paint in
apartments.2 7 Whereas, in a Title VIII environmental racism ac-
tion, if in buildings housing people of color a landlord fails ade-
quately to remedy violations, or the City fails to enforce remedies
for violations, an environmental racism claim exists.
c. Furnishing Services in Publicly-Assisted Housing
The theory underlying a section 296(5)(a)(2) "furnishing of serv-
ices" claim can also be applied to article 2-A of the Civil Rights
Law. Section 2-A of Human Rights Lawl2.8 and article 2-A of the
Civil Rights Law129 contains language identical to the proscriptions
of section 296(5)(a)(2), but pertain solely to "publicly-funded"
housing.
126. Peggy M. Shepard, Issues of Community Empowerment, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.
J. 739, 743 (1994).
127. Joel Nicholson, Lead Can Turn Kids Bad, Study Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb.
7, 1996, at 10 (quoting Lucy Billings, Director of Special Litigation, Bronx Legal Serv-
ices). See also NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2013 (1996).
128. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2-A).
129. N.Y. Civ. RIoHrs LAW § 18(c)(2).
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2-A's public-funding requirement need not be limiting.130  It
must be kept in mind that the majority of public housing develop-
ments house or were built to house lower-income people of color,
often, as a result of color-conscious state and federal housing pro-
grams intended to remedy the legacy of past discrimination.' 3 ' The
federal housing program itself has generated an intense pattern of
racial segregation in public housing, sometimes single-handedly
creating racial ghettos.132 Indeed, the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights reported that of all sources of residential segregation, the
Federal Government had been most influential in creating and
maintaining this segregation. 133 Therefore, neighborhoods with
publicly-funded housing are the very neighborhoods disproportion-
ately harmed by environmental risks. Consequently, this "limita-
tion" is not a limitation at all, but, rather, very accurately defines
the litigant base.
d. The Purpose Clause
The posture and tone of the Human Rights Law as evidenced by
its purpose clause should not be discounted. As opposed to the
state and federal constitutional provisions, the Human Rights Law
appears to grant positive rights rather than merely negative rights.
Negative rights restrict a state from acting in a certain manner.
130. Recall that Title VI's financial nexus requirement has been cited as a hurdle to
using that provision in environmental racism actions. See supra notes 114-16 and ac-
companying text.
131. Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Just Not Black and White
Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995).
132. Michael H. Schill and Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing
Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285,
1291-92 (1995).
The systematic under-maintenance and inefficient management has contributed to
the ghettoization of public housing. Provisions for operating expenses or renovation
are commonly absent but are to be covered by tenants. As incomes fall due to infla-
tion, these tenants are hard-pressed to maintain housing stocks. Apartments often do
not meet local health or safety requirements. Id. at 1296-97.
Recently, in response to the problems of severely depressed housing stocks, Con-
gress has insisted that, even if the cost of renovation would exceed that of a new
development, renovation is preferable. This is tied to Congress's one-for-one replace-
ment program, requiring that before a public housing development can be demol-
ished, a new one must be built. See id. at 1314, n.119 (discussion of Housing and
Community Development Act of 1987, 101 Stat. 1815, 1837 (1994)).
New York City has no such provision, and courts have allowed demolition in cir-
cumstances where continued losses seem unavoidable. E.g. Harmor Operating Co.,
Inc. v. Vent-O-Matic Incinerator Corp., 1 A.D.2d 551, 151 N.Y.S.2d 445 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1956).
133. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 39 (1975).
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American jurisprudence has traditionally been concerned with neg-
ative rights. Many civil liberties are negative rights.
By contrast, positive or affirmative rights create an obligation on
the part of the state and entitle individuals to demand such obliga-
tions from the state. Halloran has denominated these positive
rights to include protection from hunger, ignorance, medical need,
and lack of adequate housing.134 Indeed, in enacting the Human
Rights Law, the Legislature found that:
the state has the responsibility to act to assure that every indi-
vidual within this state is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy
a full and productive life and that the failure to provide such
equal opportunity, whether because of discrimination, prejudice,
intolerance or inadequate education, training, housing or health
care, not only threatens the rights and proper privileges of its
inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free
democratic state and threatens the peace, order, health, safety
and general welfare of the state and its inhabitants.135
Taking on this responsibility to act creates a positive right. The
positive right thus allows more progressive action under an inter-
pretation of the Human Rights Law.
This bent, particularly valuable for environmental race discrimi-
nation, is far more sophisticated than traditional housing discrimi-
nation. The discrimination in housing resulting from
environmental racism is allowing the person of color to rent hous-
ing but allowing those accommodations to be made unsafe or be
left unsafe. The effects of this new breed of discrimination are far-
reaching. Environmental racism not only deprives an individual of
a safe dwelling by placing them in a toxic home. Often times, it
places them in an equally toxic neighborhood. The toxicity cannot
be avoided through any action of the tenant, short of moving. In-
stead, it infests the tenant's body creating innumerable and immea-
surable health risks. These infestations emerge as retarded
neurological and physical development, nervous system disor-
ders,136 and toxic encephalitis 37 from lead paint, lung cancer and
related caners from asbestos.' 38 Environmental exposures may ag-
134. Halloran, supra note 19, at 253.
135. Koerner v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 442, 448, 467 N.E.2d 232, 234, 478 N.Y.S.2d 584,
586 (1984); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 290(3).
136. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Remarks, in PREVENTING CHILDHOOD LEAD
POISONING A-3 (1991).
137. George Friedman-Jimenez, Achieving Environmental Justice: The Role of Oc-
cupational Health, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 631 (1994).
138. Id. at 615.
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gravate diseases more common in women, such as osteoporosis,
and cause them to accumulate a greater portion of lipophilic chem-
icals like PCBs, DDT, and dioxins. 139 The New York State Depart-
ment of Health has found a positive correlation between birth
defects and maternal residence near toxic facilities.14 ° Others have
found a positive correlation between residence near a toxic facility
and incidence of breast and other cancers. 141 The EPA has either
disavowed or downplayed these risks.14
These illnesses will ultimately require the diversion of monetary
resources to health care, "impooring" the individual. With time,
these health problems may affect the person's ability to work as
either she is not strong enough to perform a particular type of la-
bor or will suffer increased absenteeism. 143 Furthermore, these
toxins may even intoxicate the individual's very disposition. A re-
cent study by researchers at the University of Pittsburgh School of
Medicine'" found that boys with a higher amount of lead in their
bones were more likely to steal, set fires, and engage in violent and
other anti-social behavior.145 Previous studies had shown that lead
poisoning could cause irreversible brain damage and lower a child's
IQ. 146 In New York City, 1,894 children 6 years of age and younger
suffered lead poisoning in 1994.147 Therefore, the problem of envi-
ronmental racism goes beyond housing discrimination to touch on
most of the areas identified for correction and aggressive action 148
by the Human Rights Law. Although the enactors of the Human
Rights Law never knew that they would have to deal with the
problem of environmental racism, this law can address the heart
and scope of the problem.
Adequate remedies to environmental racism will increasingly re-
quire showing the full scope of the problem. The affirmative
139. Samara F. Swantson, Race, Gender, Age, and Disproportionate Impact: What
Can We Do About the Failure to Protect the Most Vulnerable?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
577, 591-92 (1994).
140. See id. at 580.
141. Id.
142. See id. at n.15.
143. These effects may not surface for years. Asbestos-induced cancers, for exam-
ple, have a latency period of 15 to 50 years. Friedman-Jimenez, supra note 137, at
615.
144. Herbert L. Needleman et al., Bone Lead Levels and Delinquent Behavior, 275
JAMA 363 (1996).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Nicholson, supra note 127, at 10 (citing City Health Department statistics).
148. See generally State Div. of Human Rights v. Board of Educ., 46 A.D.2d 483,
363 N.Y.S.2d 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
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stance of the purpose clause of the Human Rights Law allows this.
Thus, practitioners should not overlook the purpose clause when
raising environmental racism claims before a reluctant bench.
D. The New York City Administrative Code
Both the New York City Administrative Code's Civil Rights
Chapter empowering a Human Rights Commission and its Hous-
ing Maintenance Code contain provisions related to housing and
housing risks. The two provisions are quite different in their pur-
pose and scope, but both can be useful to environmental racism
plaintiffs.
1. New York City Human Rights Commission
Title 8 of the New York City Administrative Code, addressing
"Civil Rights," provides for a Commission on Human Rights. 149
Not surprisingly, this provision parallels the Human Rights Law.
Recognizing "no greater danger to the health, morals, safety and
welfare of the city and its inhabitants than [prejudice]," the city
council declared "[p]rejudice, intolerance, bigotry, and discrimina-
tion" a menace to the state.150
In addition to its duty to work toward "harmonious intergroup
relations,' 51 study the problem, 52 issue reports, 53 and enlist other
groups to create programs, 54 the Commission is also empowered
to "receive, investigate and pass upon complaints and to initiate
complaints" into discriminatory practices enumerated in § 8-107.155
This section provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory prac-
tice to refuse to, inter alia, sell, rent, or lease housing accommoda-
tions to a person156 or "to discriminate against any person ... in the
terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any
such housing accommodation or an interest therein or in the fur-
nishing of facilities or services in connection therewith" because of
their perceived race, color, or national origin.157 The Act defines
149. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-103 (1996).
150. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-101.
151. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-105(1).
152. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-105(3).
153. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-105(7),(10).
154. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-105(2).
155. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-105(4).
156. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(a)(1).
157. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(a)(2).
1310
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
"housing accommodation" to include "publicly-assisted housing"
accommodations. 158
The City Human Rights Law provides a litigant with the option
of filing a complaint with the Commission.159 This compliments the
provision in the State Human Rights Law permitting an aggrieved
individual to bring a claim before a local commission of human
rights.160 Additionally, the Commission, itself, may initiate a com-
plaint alleging unlawful discriminatory action. 16 1 The Commission
may then undertake an investigation, 62 and refer the case to an
administrative law judge to be heard. 16 3
Like the State Human Rights Law, the City Human Rights Law
offers a wide variety of remedies to victims of discrimination.
These include mediation and conciliation, 164 cease and desist or-
ders, compensatory and punitive damages, and, most notably, "the
extension of full, equal and unsegregated accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, and privileges.' 1 65 Where it is found that an unlaw-
ful practice was practiced willfully, wantonly, or maliciously, a civil
penalty of up to $100,000 may be imposed166 to be paid into the
general fund of the city.16 7
2. New York City Housing Maintenance Code
An additional provision worth noting in the New York City Ad-
ministrative Code is the very detailed Housing Maintenance
Code.168 Unlike City Civil Rights/Human Rights provisions, the
Housing Maintenance Code does not address discrimination. In-
stead, as its purpose clause explains, the legislature "found that the
enforcement of minimum standards of health and safety, fire pro-
tection, light and ventilation, cleanliness, repair and maintenance,
and occupancy in dwellings is necessary to protect the people of
the city against urban blight.' 69 Consequently, "[t]he sound en-
forcement of minimum housing standards is essential ... to bring
158. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(10). See also § 8-102(11).
159. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-109(a).
160. EXEC. LAW § 297(9).
161. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-109(c).
162. Where the Commission has initiated a complaint, no determination of prob-
able cause is needed. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-116(a).
163. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-119.
164. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-115.
165. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-120.
166. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-126(a).
167. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-127(a).
168. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 27, ch. 2.
169. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2002.
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about the basic decencies and minimal standards of healthful living
"170
The Housing Maintenance Code includes provisions addressing
repair, occupancy, and safety of housing accommodations as well
as enforcement and penalty provisions. For example, it requires
landlords to provide lighting in dwellings, entranceways, and
yards,171 and to exterminate rodents and insects. 7 2 The Code also
imposes requirements regarding ventilation in units, 73 and paint
and other wall coverings,174 sewers and drainage, 71 and collection
of wastes, 76 the types of services that easily fall within the "fur-
nishing of services" claims discussed above. 177
Most importantly for environmental discrimination plaintiffs, the
Housing Code includes Section 27-2013, a lead abatement law. 178
This law requires landlords to cover or remove interior lead paint
in housing accommodations in which a child 6 years or under re-
sides.179 The failure to enforce this section constitutes a "Class C
immediately hazardous violation.' 80  Enforcement is man-
datory.'"' Violating this section of the Housing Code can result in
a civil penalty accruing at the rate of $50 to $150 dollars per day
until the risk is abated. 8 2
Additionally, criminal penalties may be imposed where one
"willfully or recklessly violates any provisions of this chapter,"
"willfully or recklessly violates, or fails to comply with," an order
of the department pertaining to the chapter, or "intentionally fails
to act."'183 The criminal penalties that may result are a fine, impris-
onment of up to one year, or both.184
170. Id.
171. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2037, 27-2040.
172. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2018.
173. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2057.
174. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2016.
175. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 27-2026, 27-2027.
176. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 27-2020, 27-2021, 27-2022, 27-2023.
177. See supra notes 1212-128 and accompanying text.
178. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2013(h).
179. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2013(h)(1).
180. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2013(h)(3).
181. New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning v. Koch, 138 Misc. 2d 404, 524
N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987), aff'd, 139 A.D.2d 404, 526 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988).
182. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2115(a).
183. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2118(a),(b).
184. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2118(a)(3).
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3. Using The New York City Administrative Code Provisions to
Fight Environmental Racism
a. Human Rights Provisions
The New York City Human Rights Code, like its state counter-
part, forbids discrimination in "furnishing of services." Strategies
suggested with regard to these provisions in both privately owned
and publicly-assisted housing accommodations, can be applied
under this section.
Additionally, under the New York City Civil Rights/Human
Rights provisions, fines and damages can be levied. Indeed, if this
type of litigation becomes widespread, plaintiffs may, ultimately, be
able to convince courts to impose civil damages each with a price
tag of up to $50,000. This might cause one of two things: either the
economic deterrent finally takes effect, or these penalties, which go
into a general city fund, could, with the guiding hand of the Human
Rights Commission, be earmarked for improving the toxic prem-
ises and neighborhoods.
b. Housing Maintenance Code
The discussion of the Human Rights Law and the coordinate
City provision spoke of "piggybacking" environmental racism
claims onto more traditional or straightforward claims. Housing
Maintenance Code violations are precisely the types of claims to
which an environmental racism action can be attached. Further-
more, the Housing Code enumerates the types of services or facili-
ties that are frequent components of "model" environmental
racism claims. These include the duty of landlords to meet Hous-
ing Code requirements concerning ventilation,8 5 lead paint, 86
sewage 187 and wastes188 in dwellings.
For example, in New York, the main cause of lead poisoning is
poorly maintained housing built before the ban on interior lead
paint. 8 9 Nonetheless, since 1982, the City of New York has had a
lead abatement law that mandates that landlords either remove
lead-based paints from apartments or cover it.' 90 This is found
within the Housing Maintenance Code. Where a landlord fails to
185. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2057.
186. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2016.
187. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2026, 27-2027.
188. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 27-2020, 27-2021, 27-2022, 27-2023.
189. Shepard, supra note 126, at 743.
190. See Nicholson, supra note 127 (Comments of Lucy Billings, Director of Special
Litigation, Bronx Legal Services).
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abate this risk, or the City, entrusted to enforce this provision,'
systematically fails to enforce lead paint violations or allows land-
lords simply to cover lead paint in buildings housing people of
color, thus disproportionately (as described in the theoretical and
litigation paradigms of Title VI and Title VIII) exposing them to
this risk, an environmental racism claim exists.
IV. CONCLUSION
Meaningful legal remedies to environmental racism demand in-
novative approaches, educating courts, and pushing them to think
about old laws in new ways. When it comes to innovation, New
York courts have traditionally been more progressive than their
federal counterparts. Consequently, practioners must be careful
not to ignore state bases. Unfortunately, neglect is already too
easy for there is virtually no environmental racism litigation on
state grounds and legal commentary continues to focus almost ex-
clusively on Federal Title VI and Title VIII.
Although there are certainly instances where a federal program
or strong financial nexus is quite visible, and, therefore, it will be
appropriate to litigate under the federal statute, there are many
instances where state law can compliment, if not supplant, federal
law. Indeed, at this developmental stage, it is preferable for early
efforts to be directed at the state level rather than allowing federal
law to become a harsh standard against which subsequent state
claims are measured, thus undermining that independent analysis.
New York provides several options for environmental racism
plaintiffs. Foremost among these is the state Human Rights Law.
The Human Rights Law includes the "furnishing of services" lan-
guage so favored in Title VIII, but goes well beyond this prohibit-
ing traditional housing discrimination, discrimination on delivery
of services, and discrimination in publicly-funded housing. More-
over, the Human Rights Law was intended to be aggressive, pro-
gressive, and expansive, thus making it the superior tool for New
York practitioners waging a battle against environmental race
discrimination.
Additionally, the New York City Administrative Code provi-
sions regarding discrimination (which lifts the language of the
Human Rights Law) and housing standards remind us that munici-
palities may have their own provisions of varying scopes, remedies,
and enforcement mechanisms. These, too, can be used as compo-
191. Coalition to End Lead Poisoning, 138 Misc.2d at 190, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
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nents in environmental discrimination claims, in some instances
providing an independent cause of action and in others providing a
more traditional cause of action on which a novel state claim can
ride.
Therefore, be they state remedies, municipal remedies, or a com-
bination of both, New York civil rights litigators must remember
that as-yet-untested "local" laws exceed any similar laws at the fed-
eral level in their promise for protecting people of color from being
relegated to toxic housing environments simply because they lack
the financial or political clout to avoid being "The Other Person's
Back Yard." As we focus the fight against environmental racism,
this sword must not be forgotten for it may well prove to be our
most piercing weapon.

